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ABSTRACT. – We consider descriptive macroeconometric models with random coefficients in
order to capture the possible relationship between the coefficients in the equations of the variables under
the (partial) control of the authorities and those in the behavioral equations as observed in the rational
expectation framework. This relationship is the main element of the Lucas Critique. This model family
allows us to test for the immunity to this critique and implicitly for the presence of contemporaneous
breaks as in the approach proposed by HENDRY [1988] and ENGLE and HENDRY [1993]. When the immu-
nity is rejected, we then can also propose a measure of the consequences of some particular changes
in the coefficients involved in the policy equation on modeled macroeconomic variables. We illustrate this
approach on French data. Starting from descriptive considerations, we specify a system of linear equa-
tions with random coefficients to study the response of the French household consumption to the
changes in monetary policy linked to the entry in EMS and the Maastricht Treaty.
Évaluation des politiques et modèles macroéconomiques
doublement stochastiques
RÉSUMÉ. – Nous considérons des modèles macroéconométriques descriptifs avec des coeffi-
cients aléatoires afin de capter les éventuelles relations qui peuvent exister entre les coefficients des
équations qui déterminent les variables sous contrôle (partiel) du gouvernement et ceux des équations
de comportement comme dans le cadre des modèles à anticipations rationnelles. Ce type de relations
est l'élément principal de la critique de Lucas. Cette famille de modèles permet de tester si la critique
de Lucas s'applique et implicitement la présence de ruptures contemporaines comme dans l'approche
proposée par HENDRY [1988] et  ENGLE et HENDRY [1993]. Quand la critique s'applique, nous pouvons
aussi proposer une mesure des conséquences sur les données macroéconomiques de quelques chan-
gements de politiques associés à des modifications de coefficients particuliers des équations des
variables sous contrôle (partiel) du gouvernement. Nous illustrons cette approche sur des données fran-
çaises. En nous appuyant sur des considérations descriptives, nous spécifions un système d'équations
linéaires avec des coefficients aléatoires pour étudier la réponse de la consommation des ménages fran-
çais à une modification de la politique monétaire associée à l'entrée dans le système monétaire euro-
péen et à la mise en place des conséquences du traité de Maastricht.
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1 Introduction
In his famous 1976 paper, LUCAS suggested that using a simultaneous equa-
tions model for policy analysis and policy simulation is only valid when
agents’ expectation rules are embedded in its functional form since they are
supposed to change with the changes in policy.1 To state his critique, he used
the rational expectation equilibrium (REE) framework in which this property
is satisfied by the expectation rules. Nevertheless, the status of these changes
has been the basis for critiques of a strict reading of the critique itself (SIMS
[1982 and 1987], SARGENT [1984] and COOLEY, LEROY, and RAYMON [1984])
in the sense that if such changes can occur and agents are rational and know
the model,2 they should be able to associate probability measures with these
events and they should take them into account when computing their fore-
casts. If the agents consider that the current value of the parameter associated
with the current policy have a large probability to remain unchanged, the
regime changes considered by LUCAS are rationally negligible. Nevertheless,
the critique keeps its relevance and applied macroeconometricians are asked
to evaluate the consequences of a change in policy on some key variables in
situation in which agents’ decision process may be affected by the change.
The strict reading of the critique led to the recommendation to separate the
structural parameters such as those that measure tastes and technology from
those associated with policies that are to be modeled as different drawings of
random processes (COOLEY, LEROY, and RAYMON [1984]). The question of
interest then becomes how to model the changes in policy with relevant
stochastic processes based on the economic and political institutions. This is
an ambitious task. Another reading of the Lucas Critique emphasizes the fact
that models are defective approximations. But solving a REE entails establi-
shing the existence of functional relationships between two sets of
parameters: Parameters related to a policy choice and those related to agents’
behavior. Since non linearities are generally present in the derivation of the
forecasting rules, specification errors may have drastic consequences on these
functional links that are rarely analytical. In empirical works, this may lead to
flimsily measured effects of a policy change.
Considering the above arguments, we choose to neglect the RE framework.
An alternative and modest approach consists in relying on more descriptive
properties of the data. We introduce a model of which structural features3 are
based on the statistical properties derived from an economic analysis. We
propose to use random coefficients in order to model the possible link
between the coefficients in the behavioral equations and those related with, in
our case, the monetary policy. We are then interested in testing for the
presence of this link and in plotting it when it exists.
Econometricians have focused for the last twenty years on the problem of
designing a statistical framework to test for the invariance of behavioral equa-
74
1. Policy changes means for us a change in the value of the structural parameters that define the
authority preferences.
2. A basic assumption in rational expectation equilibrium literature.
3. In the sense of HARVEY.
tions to policy changes captured by shifts in the coefficients of the equation
for the variables under (partial) control of the authorities (see inter alia,
HENDRY [1988], ENGLE and HENDRY [1993], FAVERO and HENDRY [1992]).
This testing approach only considers simultaneous modifications of the coef-
ficients which is consistent with the rational expectation framework, but
should be relaxed in a more realistic framework which would include for
instance some learning. Moreover, when the null of absence of a relationship
is rejected, it does not offer any guidance on how likely the coefficients are to
change again in the future. In contrast, the use of a random coefficient model
allows us to quantify the departure from stability and to perform simulations
and forecasts under the assumption that simulated changes are close to those
that have been observed in the past. If this assumption were not satisfied, any
simulation would be meaningless.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts. In a second part, we
introduce the doubly stochastic processes, characterize in this framework the
invariance properties and present an approach for testing for the immunity to
the Lucas Critique. In Section 3, a small Monte Carlo experiment is
commented. The fourth part is devoted to a macroeconomic analysis of the
source of breaks observed in the French household consumption function at
the beginning of the nineties. A major modification is related to the indepen-
dence of the French Central Bank and the possible modification of its
preferences it implied. This helps us to specify a descriptive model that is
estimated and a test for the immunity to the Lucas Critique is then performed.
A brief conclusion ends the paper.
2 Doubly Stochastic Models
Linear models with random coefficients were the subject of numerous
studies in the seventies and eighties (see, for instance, CHOW [1984]). Various
estimation methods and test procedures were developed for handling models
in which no lagged endogenous variables were present. These models have
been used in macroeconomic studies (inter alia COOLEY and PRESCOTT
[1973]) sometimes in the context of policy evaluation (SIMS [1982]) or fore-
casting (DOAN, LITTERMAN and SIMS [1984]).
The statistical treatment of models with lagged endogenous variables and
random coefficients is more recent and burdensome. In the absence of exoge-
nous variables, these models are called doubly stochastic time series. Their
mathematical properties have been studied by inter alia POURAHMADI [1986,
1988] and TJOSTHEIM [1986] for univariate time series, and MEYN and GUO
[1993] for multivariate time series.
We propose to use a similar set-up to describe simultaneously the dynamics
of some well chosen macroeconomic policy-dependent and agent-dependent
variables, these dynamics depend on random parameters. This allows us to
describe the possible dependence that may exist between both sets of random
parameters, those related to a policy choice and those related to agents’ beha-
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vior. In practice, we postulate linear relationships between endogenous
variables (ie, policy variables, agents’ decisions variables) and exogenous
variables. Their coefficients are time varying and may be mutually dependent.
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the coefficients follow them-
selves a time series model. This model family can be viewed as a particular
kind of conditional heteroskedastic model, which specification is derived
from a descriptive structural framework in the spirit of structural time series
modeling proposed by HARVEY [1989]. This is consistent with the approach
proposed by ENGLE and HENDRY [1993].
2.1 A Simple Framework
We start by motivating our approach and defining the property of invariance
for a set of equations in a doubly stochastic set-up. We consider multivariate
ergodic stochastic variable (zt ,yt ) whose data generating process is driven by
an unobservable multivariate stochastic process αt that corresponds to some
key parameters of the observable DGP. These observable data can be decom-
posed into two sub-vectors zt and yt . zt includes the variables under the
(partial) control of the authorities and yt represents variables chosen by the
private agents. Similarly αt can be decomposed into two sub-vectors(
αz,t ,αy,t
)
where αz,t denotes the vector of random coefficients in the
government equations and αy,t denotes those in agents’ equations. For
instance the authorities choose the relative importance they attribute to unem-
ployment and inflation and act on variables such as tax rates and interest rates
to reach their aims. Households optimally decide on the level of their
consumption knowing authorities’ preferences. According to Lucas Critique,
a change in the policy of the authorities (here a change in the relative weight
of the two targets) implies a change in the coefficients in the households’
decision equations. When these coefficients are not affected by such a change,
the equation is said to be invariant and policy simulations consistent with this
kind of changes can be performed.
A change in authorities’ preferences could be captured by an intervention
function whose general form is αz,t = g
(
zt−1,yt−1,αz,t−1,αy,t−1,ηt
)
where
xs stands for {xs,. . . ,x0} and ηt is a structural shock. It says that according to
what they observed in the past, the authorities may change their preferences
and then the coefficients in the equations that describe the way they fix the
variables under their (partial) control. αy,t is then said invariant to g (.) if it
remains unchanged when αz,t is generated by g (.), technically speaking:
∂αy,t
∂αz,t
∣∣∣αz,t=g(zt−1,yt−1,αz,t−1,αy,t−1,ηt) = 0
For this framework to be operational, we have to complete it in specifying
the intervention function and the link that may exist between αy,t and αz,t .
We must emphasize that without a theory on the way political decisions are
taken, it is not possible to learn something about the invariance of αy,t to
interventions that did not occur in the past. In practice, we need to be able to
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identify and interpret the important past changes from estimated quantities in
order to perform informative simulations. In a pragmatic approach, we
propose to restrict our attention to simple time-series coefficient generating
processes that can mimic various functional forms and complete the model
with a linear relationship between αy,t and αz,t .
2.2 The Dynamics of Random Coefficients
The introduction of random coefficients may increase significantly the
number of coefficients to estimate. Therefore, we propose to limit the use of
random coefficients to some key coefficients in the set of equations chosen
according to the question we want to answer. Moreover because changes will
occur several times over a reasonable period but with unequal persistence and
amplitude, we include two sources of fluctuations: the first one reflects rare
and persistent changes of a large amplitude while the second one produces
small but frequent shocks. We propose to limit our attention to the following
family of Coefficient Generating Processes:
(1)
T (L)
(
αz,t − αz
αy,t − αy
)
= 	 (L) (µt + ρηt ) ⇔(
Tz (L) 0
0 Ty (L)
)(
αz,t − αz
αy,t − αy
)
=
(
	z (L)
	y (L)
)
(µt + ρηt )
where T (L) ,Tz (L) and Ty (L) are diagonal polynomial matrices, 	 (L),
	z (L) and 	y (L) are polynomial vectors, µt is a unidimensional dummy
variable which splits the sample in sub-samples according to well-known
institutional or political modifications and ηt is a unidimensional unit-
variance white noise. We therefore focus on particular models in which
changes in the time-varying coefficients are driven by a unique source of
shocks. The different dynamics of the coefficients are due to different coeffi-
cient values and lag structures for each polynomial. More elaborate models
can be specified in particular regarding the dimension of the shocks used to
describe the policy changes, but this should result from theoretical a prioris.
An alternative modeling would consist in assuming that the coefficient
processes are integrated of order one.4 This approach has been used several
times in the past (COOLEY and PRESCOTT [1973] or MACNELIS and NEFTÇI
[1982] inter alia) and assumes that each random coefficient process has his
own innovation process independent from the other ones. On the contrary, in
our approach, we propose to consider a model in which the source of
stochastic shocks in the random coefficients is unique.
In this framework, as the coefficients are a priori random, a Bayesian treat-
ment of exogeneity may be of interest, see FLORENS and MOUCHART [1985],
but is beyond the scope of this paper. The random coefficient model is more
flexible than other nonlinear models also popular in macroeconometrics. The
deterministic break-point approach does not provide any tool to do forecas-
ting. The Markov-switching model (HAMILTON [1989]) would consist in
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4. In section 2.5.2, we give some technical reasons to explain why we do not follow this approach.
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assuming that αz,t and αy,t are Markov chains that take on a finite number of
values (corresponding to various regimes). The Threshold Autoregressive
(TAR) model of TONG [1990] has the same disadvantage of offering only a
finite number of regimes and similarly the Smooth Transition Autoregressive
model (TERASVIRTA [1994]). In these models, the authorities would change
their preferences by selecting in a finite set of possible choices according to
the value taken by some endogenous or predetermined variable that should
not be observable or predictable by the agents. A VAR specification for αy,t
and αz,t is simpler. It allows them to take any value in R. Moreover, it can be
viewed as a weak linear representation of stationary non linear processes such
as stationary markov-switching or TAR models.
We need to impose some restrictions on Model (1). First, the model with the
above parameterization is not identified, we cannot distinguish between the
zero-degree coefficients in the polynomial 	 (L) and the standard error of ηt.
A possible identifiability condition is ‖	 (0)‖ = 1. This allows for situations
in which the zero-degree coefficient of a component of the polynomial 	 (L)
is zero, capturing the existence of a delay in the modification of the corres-
ponding coefficient.
Second, we want to limit our attention to the canonical weak stationary
representation of the stochastic coefficients. We assume that the roots of each
couple of polynomials 
(
Tj (L) ,	j (L)
)
related to the j th component are
different and of modulus strictly larger than one. The link between any couple
of parameters 
(
αz,i,t ,αy, j,t
)
, αz,i,t being the ith component of αz,t and αy, j,t
being the jth component of αy,t , is approximated by:
αy, j,t = αy, j + Ty, j (L)−1 	y, j (L) 	z,i (L)−1 Tz,i (L)
(
αz,i,t − αz,i
)
This formula can mimic a large set of functional links.
2.3 Testing for the Lucas Critique
ERICSSON and IRONS [1995] find that the Lucas Critique does not seem to be
an important empirical critique. Their finding may be related to the fact that
most of the studies look for coincident breaks in coefficients of the variables
under (partial) control of the government and those of the behavioral equa-
tion(s). This is consistent with the REE framework. Our testing strategy is
slightly different from that proposed by ENGLE, HENDRY and RICHARD [1983],
HENDRY [1988], ENGLE and HENDRY [1993] and FAVERO and HENDRY [1992].
Here, we consider a larger family of functional links between the two sets of
coefficients, with possible lagged effects. This corresponds to a larger inter-
pretation of the Lucas Critique that may give it a stronger empirical relevance.
As REE assumptions do not seem satisfied in practice, it is cautious to depart
from them. Furthermore, the use of random coefficients seems natural when
the number of changes is large and when we are interested in approximating
the relationship which may exist between the two sets of parameters. Notice
that the co-breaking approach does not provide the tools to perform simula-
tion studies.
In our setting, constancy of the parameters and invariance can be expressly
tested for. The constancy of the parameters, αy,t = αy and αz,t = αz , corres-
ponds to ρ = 0 and (µt ) = 0 (under the initial conditions αy,0 = αy and
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αz,0 = αz .) The invariance of the αy to some modifications of the αz corres-
ponds to the event A ∪ B (A or B) where A = {	y (L) = 0 and 	z (L) =/ 0}
and B = {	z (L) = 0 and 	y (L) =/ 0} . This states the non existence of
(simultaneous) causality between the two sets of coefficients. It does not
preclude the possibility that the αy,t coefficients are varying, but these varia-
tions are not related to those of αz,t . In general, testing for hypotheses
concerning unions of mutually exclusive events is not an easy task. Here, we
have to take into account the identification problem evoked in the preceding
section, so that under the selected parameterization, 	y (L) and 	z (L)
cannot be simultaneously equal to 0. We then limit our attention to the null
hypothesis 	y (L) = 0. When the invariance hypothesis is rejected, a
graphical plot of the relationships between the coefficients can be easily done.
In conclusion, we want to test whether we can parsimoniously describe the
changes in some coefficients with a unique source of noise. If this feature is
not in the data, the above test strategy should reject this specification.
Otherwise, this allows us to capture co-movements between the coefficients.
We thus propose to reconsider the concept of invariance in a larger setup and
to shift the problem of the possible non-constancy of the parameters in the
expectation rule to that of possible propagation of changes in the way these
rules are updated.
2.4 Limits and Advantages of this Approach
This approach has at least two limits. First, as said above, it is descriptive. If
the changes in policy are not well identified or important enough, the estima-
tion will not be precise. It may be difficult to provide meaningful
interpretation of the results if we are not able to refer to a well-known event.
Second, its cost in parameters is large. Introducing a random coefficient in a
model implies the introduction of several coefficients for modeling its data
generating process. The model coefficients that are to be stochastically
modeled must be well chosen and the data generating process parsimonious.
This choice is to be driven by structural considerations. A risk of overparame-
terization exists.
Its main advantage is that it provides a framework which allows us to
control for the size of the test for immunity to Lucas Critique which appears
to be the main drawback of the sequential procedure proposed by HENDRY and
his co-authors. Nevertheless, the test procedure is not simple. In particular,
non-identified nuisance parameters are present under the null hypothesis of
parameter constancy. We illustrate this point in the following part.
2.5 Asymptotic Distribution of the Test Statistics
2.5.1 Statistical Framework
In the simplest case, we propose to introduce some random coefficients in a
general autoregressive representation of a (n × 1)vector yt. 
yt =
p∑
j=1
ψt, j yt− j + εt
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We work with the AR(1) representation which can always be derived from
the AR(p) one. The data generating process (D.G.P.) we consider is thus as
follows:
Yt = t Yt−1 + Yt−1 + ε˜t
where Yt is a np × 1 vector composed of the current and up to (p − 1) lagged
values of the n × 1 vector of observations yt, t,  are two np × np
matrices such that only the n first rows of t +  are composed of (possibly
random) matrix coefficients, the n (p − 1) × np remaining rows are equal to
( In(p−1) 0n(p−1)×n ). The coefficients in t are supposed to have zero
mean. ε˜t =
(
εt
0n(p−1)×1
)
with εt ∼ i id N (0,) . We rewrite this model
and complete it by introducing the dynamics of the stochastic coefficients
present in t that we stacked into a vector α˜t. We assume it satisfies an
ARMA (1,q) representation as introduced in Section 3.2. 
α˜t = T˜ α˜t−1 + 	˜
√
ρ2ηt + 1ηt−1 + ... + qηt−q .
Let αt =
(
α˜t ,ηt−q+1,...,ηt
)′
. The model can be rewritten under the follo-
wing state-space form:
(A)
{
Yt = Ztαt + Yt−1 + ε˜t
αt = T αt−1 + 	
√
ρ2ηt
where αt is a k × 1 vector composed of the q random coefficients present in
the model and the k − q lagged values of the univariate noise ηt which is the
only source of randomness of the random coefficients, ηt ∼ i id N (0,1) and
for identification purpose, ‖( Iq 0(q×k−q) ) 	‖=1 and ( 0k−q×q Ik−q ) 	
=
( 0k−q−1×1
1
)
. Zt is a np × k matrix whose coefficients are null or equal to
the appropriate components of Yt–1.We stack the first order parameters in a
vector denoted vecφ. Similarly the coefficients of the variance-covariance
matrix of the random terms  are set in a vector vech. Let
θ = (vecφ′,vech′, ρ2)′ = (θ ′,ρ2)′ . At last we denote
K = ( In 0(n(p−1)×n) ) such that yt = K Yt and εt = K ε˜t.
If in the spirit of Section 2.2, we now introduce some dummy variables in
the Coefficient Generating Process, we get:
(B)
{ Yt = Ztαt + Yt−1 + ε˜t
αt = T αt−1 + 	
(
µt +
√
ρ2η˜t
)
with
µt =
s∑
j=1
µj 1{t∈[tj−1, tj [}
and for identification purpose t0 > −∞ and ts = +∞. The coefficient vector
θ becomes in this case 
(
θ ′,
(
µj
)
j∈{1,...s} ,ρ
2
)′
.
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2.5.2 Test Statistics
We first are interested in testing that the use of random coefficients is relevant
in Model (A). This amounts to test the null hypothesis H0: ρ2 = 0 against
Ha: ρ2 > 0. The parameter set is thus R+ , (a convex cone). Under the null,
the model is a standard autoregressive model (with possibly some constraints
on the parameters):
Yt = Yt−1 + ε˜t
The coefficients in 	 and T cannot be identified under the null, they are
nuisance parameters we must deal with in computing the distribution of the
test statistic. We set all the nuisance parameters non identified under the null
in a vector v and assume that they belong to a compact subset N of the real
space of appropriate dimension (in the sequel we denote T = Tv and 	 = 	v
to remind of the dependence of T and 	 on v). Moreover, under the null, we
are on the boundary of the parameter set for ρ2. A growing literature exists on
tests when the parameters are on the boundary under the null (see, for
instance, GOURIEROUX, HOLLY and MONFORT [1982], GOURIEROUX and
MONFORT [1989]). But in presence of nuisance parameters, the nature of the
test procedure is more complicated and was recently tackled by ANDREWS
[1999, 2001]. In such cases, the distribution may depend on the (unknown)
parameter of the model. However, in the case of Model (A), the asymptotic
distribution of the likelihood ratio (LR) test of H0 is nuisance parameter free
as stated below. Note that we consider a particular initialization of the state-
space algorithm such that the likelihood function does not depend on the
nuisance parameters under the null. Another initialization might lead to a
more complicated asymptotic distribution. This is the reason why we do not
use a random walk representation of the coefficient processes as it is
frequently done.
PROPOSITION 1: In Model (A), let θ̂0 be MLE under H0 (therefore indepen-
dent of the nuisance parameters v) and θ̂v be the MLE estimator under the
alternative Ha. Assume that the following assumptions hold: (i) there exists
δ > 0, such that ∀v ∈ N, the roots of the polynomial det (Ik − xTv) have a
modulus larger than 1 + δ, (ii) the roots of the polynomial det (In −  (x))
have modulus strictly larger than 1. Then, under H0
L R = −2
(
lnlT
(
θ̂0
) − sup
v∈N
lnlT
(
θ̂v,v
)) ⇒ 1
2
χ2 (0) + 1
2
χ2 (1)
where χ2 (0) is the Dirac distribution at the origin and χ2 (1) is a chi-
square distribution with one degree of freedom.
For significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1%, the critical values of the LR test
are 1.642, 2.706, and 5.412. In presence of deterministic terms 
(
µj
)
j∈{1,...s}
as in Equation (B) above, the LR test for constancy can also be derived.
Testing for parameter stability in Model (B) amounts to testing the null hypo-
thesis H ′0 : ρ
2 = 0,µj = 0, j = 1,...,s against H ′a : ρ2 > 0 or µj =/ 0 for
some j. The parameter set is R+ ∪ Rs. Note that the coefficients in 	 and T
and the ratio 
(
tj
T
)
j=1,...s are not identified under the null. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that the ratio 
(
tj
T
)
j=1,...s are exogenously given. They
correspond to well-known institutional changes and are not estimated. We can
construct a similar approach to the previous one to get that:
PROPOSITION 2: In Model (B), let θ̂0 be MLE under H ′0 (therefore indepen-
dent of the nuisance parameters v) and θ̂v be the MLE estimator under H ′a.
Assume that the following assumptions hold: (i) there exists δ > 0, such
that ∀v ∈ N, the roots of the polynomial det (Ik − xTv) have a modulus
larger than 1 + δ, (ii) the roots of the polynomial det (In −  (x)) have
modulus strictly larger than 1. Then, under H ′0
L R = − 2
(
lnlT
(
θ̂0
) − sup
v∈N
lnlT
(
θ̂v,v
))
⇒ 1
2
χ2 (0) + 1
2
χ2 (1) + χ2 (s) .
In our application, s = 1. In this case, the critical values of the LR test are
equal to 3.492, 4.630, and 7.382 at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level
respectively.
Remark 1: When more than one variance is under test (that is the dimen-
sion of ρ is greater than 1), the above test statistics are not nuisance parameter
free and simulations are necessary to compute their critical values.
Remark 2: It is not possible to use first step OLS estimation to derive
consistent estimates of the error terms (equal here to K (Ztαt + εt ) ) in order
to test for the presence of heteroskedasticity and detect which variables are
involved in its functional form. Indeed, the OLS first order coefficient are not
consistent as there exists autocorrelation between the lagged endogenous
variables Yt−1 and the term Ztαt.
3 Simulations
We propose to study the power and size properties of our test procedure in a
simple monetary model introduced by CLARIDA, GALI, and GERTLER [1999].
3.1 A Simple Theoretical Model
We consider a simple model. Let us denote the output gap xt (which is the
difference between actual and potential output), the inflation rate πt, and the
nominal interest rate it . We represent the baseline model in terms of an IS
curve:
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(2) xt = Et xt+1 − ϕ
(
it − Etπt+1
) + ηt
and a Phillips curve:
(3) πt = λxt + γ Etπt+1 + εt
where
ηt = µηt−1 + ut ,
εt = νεt−1 + vt .
and 0  ν,µ  1 and ut and vt are i.i.d. with zero mean and variance σ 2u and
σ 2v respectively. Taking private agents’ expectations as given, the government
chooses it so that it minimizes the intertemporal objective function:
(4) min
it
Et
∞∑
τ=1
δτ
1
2
(
1
1 + z2τ
x2τ +
z2τ
1 + z2τ
π2τ
)
.
As the focus of the monetary policy changes over time, it is assumed that
the relative weight given by the government to inflation and output can be
described by a random process (Zt )t that we will specify later. Conditional on
zt , the decision of the government leads to:
(5) xt = −λz2t πt .
It is assumed that the agents do not observe zt . The agents solve (2) and (3).
To find the equilibrium solution, we first postulate an expression for πt:
(6) πt = atεt .
with,
at = βat−1 + wt .
From (3) and (5), we obtain:
πt = −λ2z2t πt + γ Et at+1εt+1 + εt
= −λ2z2t πt + γβνatεt + εt .
So that πt satisfies: (
1 + λ2z2t
)
πt = (1 + γβνat ) εt .
To be consistent with (6), we need:
at = 1
1 − γβν + λ2z2t
.
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The dynamics of at determines the dynamics of z2t . On the other hand, we
have a constraint of positivity on z2t :
z2t =
1
λ2at
− (1 − γβν)
λ2
> 0.
For this to be satisfied, at needs to lie in the interval [0,a¯] with
a¯ = 1/ (1 − γβν) . We therefore choose wt such that its support is equal to
[0,(1 − β) a¯] . More precisely in the simulations, we take wt i.i.d.
U[0,(1 − β) a¯] .
From Equation (2), we can infer the dynamic of it so that the general solu-
tion is given by:
(7)
πt = atεt ,
xt = −λz2t atεt ,
it = λ
ϕ
z2t atεt −
ν
λϕ
+ νβ
[
1 + (1 − γβν) 1
λϕ
]
atεt + 1
ϕ
ηt .
Model (2) to (4) is the basis for a simulation study presented in the next
section. Note that this model is illustrative only and supposes some simpli-
fying assumptions: (a) the agents have no knowledge whatsoever about the
value of zt , (b) the government objective function has a simple form meant to
simplify the calculations.
3.2 Results from Monte Carlo Experiments
Consider two types of models:
Model VAR: We generate data under H0:
(8)
{ it = φi i it−1 + φi x xt−1 + σiεi t
xt = φxx xt−1 + φxi it−1 + σxεxt
where εi t , and εxt are i.i.d. bivariate centered normal with correlation σi x .
Model RE: We generate data from the simple model presented in Equations
(2) to (4) which plays the role of the alternative. Using these two sets of simu-
lated data, we estimate a random coefficient model:
(9)
{
it =
(
φi i + φi i,t
)
it−1 + φi x xt−1 + σiεi t
xt =
(
φxx + φxx,t
)
xt−1 + φxi it−1 + σxεxt
where εi t , and εxt are supposed to be i.i.d. bivariate centered normal with
correlation σi x . Let φ˜t = (φi i t ,φxxt )′ where φ˜t follows a bivariate stationary
ARMA(1,1):
φ˜t = D˜φ˜t−1 + 	1ρut + 	2ρut−1
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with ut i.i.d. N(0,1). The matrix D˜ is diagonal with diagonal element
(d1,d2) , 	1 = (	11,	12)′ and 	2 = (	21,	22)′ . Note that the model RE
for it and xt is a VAR if the relative weights in the target are fixed constant
(zt = z for all t). However, when zt is random, Model RE cannot be written
exactly as Model (9) because it generates conditional heteroskedasticity that
is not taken into account in Model (9). Below we are going to discuss a LR
test of (8) versus (9) and apply this test to data generated by RE, we will show
that the LR test has power against RE in spite of the misspecification induced
by the omitted heteroskedasticity.
Model (9) may be rewritten as:
αt = Dαt−1 + 	ρut
with αt =
(
φ˜′t ,ut
)
, µ = (µ˜′,0)′ , 	 = (	11,	12,1)′, and:
D =
[ d1 0 	21ρ
0 d2 	22ρ
0 0 0
]
.
For identification, we need to impose (1) the sign of the components of 	2
and (2) ‖	1‖ = 1. We want to test H0: ρ2 = 0 against H1: ρ2 > 0. This is
not a standard problem for two reasons. First, under H0, the parameter is at
the boundary of its space. Second, under H0, various nuisance parameters are
not identified. Let v denote these parameters. ANDREWS [2001] proposes to
use a supv∈I L R (v) test and shows that the asymptotic distribution may
depend on the parameters of interest. Here interestingly, the asymptotic distri-
bution is nuisance parameter free and is a mixture of a mass point at zero and
a Chi-square distribution as given in Proposition 1.
The simulations are performed with GAUSS. To initialize the optimization
procedure ‘optmum’, we use the parameters obtained from a VAR model
(model under H0).
For all the simulations, the sample size is n = 100, and the number of
simulations is rep = 1000 . The empirical critical values are computed from
5000 replications of a sample of 100 generated by Model VAR with parameter
values: φi i = 0.3,φi x = 0.03,φxx = 0.3,φxi = 0.03,σi = 0.1, σx = 0.1,
σi x = −0.01 (first line of Table 1). They are equal to 11.237, 7.418, 5.609 for
1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. In Table 1, we report the
rejection rate of the LR test when data are generated under H0 (that is Model
VAR). In Table 2, we give the same rejection rate when data are generated
under the alternative Model RE. The empirical size/power corresponds to the
rejection rates when the test statistic is compared with the theoretical critical
values (given by the asymptotic distribution). The size-corrected size/power
corresponds to the rejection rate when the test statistic is compared with the
empirical critical values. 
The LR test exhibits an important size distortion in small samples that can
be corrected using empirical critical values. A good point is that the LR test
exhibits a high power against the RE alternative. 
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4 French Household Consumption
and the Independence of the Central
Bank
4.1 Some Possible Economic Mechanisms
4.1.1 A Basic Framework
As an illustration, we propose to consider the influence of the expected
changes in monetary policy on household consumption decisions. We draw on
a now standard literature devoted to the effects of monetary policy in presence
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TABLE 1
Size of LR Test
1% 5% 10%
φi i = 0.3,φiy = 0.03,φyy = 0.3,φyi = 0.03, emp. size .109 .314 .455
σi = 0.1,σy = 0.1,σiy = −0.01 size corr. size .010 .050 .10
φi i = 0.3,φiy = 0.03,φyy = 0.3,φyi = 0.03, emp. size .309 .782 .988
σi = 0.4,σy = 0.4,σiy = −0.01 size corr. size .030 .146 .293
φi i = 0.6,φiy = 0.03,φyy = 0.6,φyi = 0.03, emp. size .111 .300 .462
σi = 0.1,σy = 0.1,σiy = −0.01 size corr. size .010 .041 .099
φi i = 0.3,φiy = 0.03,φyy = 0.3,φyi = 0.03, emp. size .179 .475 .674
σi = 0.2,σy = 0.2,σiy = −0.1 size corr. size .022 .085 .169
TABLE 2
Power of LR Test
1% 5% 10%
ν = 0.2 , µ = 0.5, β = 0.8 , γ = 0.6, emp. power 1 1 1
λ = 0.4,ϕ = 0.05 , σv = 0.2, σu = 0.2. size corr. power .812 1 1
ν = 0.5 , µ = 0.5, β = 1, γ = 0.6, emp. power 1 1 1
λ = 0.4,ϕ = 0.05 , σv = 0.2, σu = 0.2. size corr. power .723 1 1
ν = 0.2 , µ = 0.5, β = 0.8 , γ = 0.6, emp. power 1 1 1
λ = 0.4,ϕ = 0.05 , σv = 0.2, σu = 0.2. size corr. power .812 1 1
ν = 0.2 , µ = 0.5, β = 0.8 , γ = 0.6, emp. power 1 1 1
λ = 0.4,ϕ = 0.05 , σv = 0.2, σu = 0.2. size corr. power .812 1 1
ν = 0.2 , µ = 0.5, β = 0.8 , γ = 0.8, emp. power 1 1 1
λ = 0.4,ϕ = 0.05 , σv = 0.2, σu = 0.2. size corr. power .823 1 1
ν = 0, µ = 0, β = 0.8 , γ = 0.6, emp. power 1 1 1
λ = 0.4,ϕ = 0.05 , σv = 0.2, σu = 0.2. size corr. power 0.839 1 1
of temporary nominal price rigidities.5 These rigidities create a short term
dilemma between the inflation and the output gap and may generate unem-
ployment. Hence, the monetary authorities select their control variable –the
nominal short term interest rate– in order to satisfy at best their conflicting
objectives regarding the output gap and the inflation rate.
Our illustration deals with French economy. In a small open economy with
a large index of openness such as France, we expect the nominal exchange
rate to have also a direct influence on the inflation rate. Moreover, the
nominal exchange rate is very likely one of the monetary authorities’ objec-
tives as the country is involved in a monetary agreement on quasi-fixed
parities with some foreign countries within the European Monetary System
(EMS). Meeting this obligation contributes to the credibility of the monetary
policy. A measure of the output gap, the inflation rate and the nominal
exchange rate seem to be good candidates to play the role of the conflicting
objectives of the monetary policy in a small open economy such as France.
On the one hand, empirical studies have illustrated at a micro and an aggre-
gate level the influence of real interest rate on the household consumption
(WICKENS and MOLANA [1984], ATTANAZIO and WEBER [1993]). On the other
hand, recent papers have illustrated empirically and theoretically the impor-
tance of income uncertainty on household consumption (see inter alia
CARROLL [1997], CARROLL and KIMBALL [1996], DEATON [1991], ZELDES
[1989]). A change in the relative weights in the objective function of the
central bank will result in different levels of real interest rate and of unem-
ployment. Once aware of this change, the households will revise their
consumption path consequently. Indeed, this change modifies their (percep-
tion of the) probability of been unemployed and the real return of assets,
modifications which alter the mean and the variance of their real wealth path.
We would expect that such an uncertainty may imply an increase of their
savings and a reduction of their consumption. We propose to study if it is
statistically possible to detect such a modification in some coefficients of a set
of descriptive equations linking household consumption and macroeconomic
variables monitored by monetary authorities. We particularly focus on a date
corresponding to an institutional modification that may have induced a
possible change in the way monetary policy is set.
4.1.2 A Brief Historical Overview
Historically, French Monetary policy went through various regimes. Capital
control accompanied by credit control and price control was the main tool of
the French monetary policy up to the beginning of the eighties. In 1973,
France entered the European currency snake, but left it in January 1974. In
1979, France entered the European Monetary System. Three devaluations
occurred between May 1981 and March 1983. After 1983, the monetary
policy aimed at controlling the inflation rate and ensuring the stability of the
French Franc parity inside the European monetary system. This was accom-
panied by a break in the wage setting rule. This led to swift adjustments of the
French nominal interest rates to the changes of those of its European partners,
mainly Germany. French monetary authorities have been clearly and heavily
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5. See inter alia GOODFRIEND and KING [1997], WALSH [1998].
influenced by the German monetary policy since 1979 in order to maintain
the French Franc parity in a long term concern of building the European
community. In particular, parities were not adjusted in the EMS (except for
the Italian Lira) after the Basles-Nyborg agreements at the beginning of 1987.
CLARIDA, GALI and GERTLER [1998] have illustrated the influence of German
monetary policy on its European partners and concluded that this led to
interest rates higher than warranted by domestic macroeconomic conditions.
The Maastricht Treaty was concluded on December 10, 1991 by the leaders of
EC nations in Maastricht, the Netherlands, and formally signed on
February 7, 1992. In the referendum of September 1992, the French voted
only narrowly in favor of it. As a consequence of the Treaty, French Central
Bank got its independence at the end of 1993.
On the other hand, a deregulation of the French financial market took place
in late 1985, early 1986. This induced a decrease of firms’ credit demand to
the banks. In response, the latter increased their supply to households. This
contributed significantly to the increase in household consumption up to the
end of the eighties. The international slowdown at the beginning of the nine-
ties dampened the growth of French household disposable income and put in
economic difficulty a large number of households heavily in debt. An adjust-
ment was necessary and was implemented through a set of laws (lois Neiertz
in 1993). Empirically, we observed in France at the beginning of the nineties,
a break in the standard empirical household consumption function. Some
empirical works have tried to find an omitted variable which would make this
relationship stable (BONNET and DUBOIS [1995] inter alia). A good candidate
was the unemployment rate, although the relevance of its interaction with the
household consumption decision at the beginning of the nineties and not
before this period, was not really analyzed. We think that the above arguments
about uncertainty give a rationale to the presence of unemployment rate in the
household consumption equation. An additional argument should be given to
explain the introduction of this variable only at the beginning of the nineties.
The source of the break in the consumption equation may be related to the
uncertainty associated with the possible institutional changes implied by the
European construction and the Maastricht Treaty. The French Central Bank
was to become independent and its objectives were to be restricted to the level
of inflation and the parity French Franc against Deutschemark. This might
have distorted the relationship between inflation and unemployment and
might justify the introduction of the unemployment rate in the consumption
equation.
As a starting point, without structural model that would allow us to distin-
guish between different possible explanations, we propose simply to
investigate if the breaks in the household consumption equation coefficients
can be related to a break in the way interest rate was set by the monetary
authorities at the beginning of the nineties.
4.2 A Simple Multivariate Model
Our model is a simple descriptive VARX model of six variables whose
choice is induced by the preceding descriptive section. These are the real
exchange rate, the interest rate, the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, the
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TABLE 3
The Data
it real interest rate quarterly average Banque de France
ut unemployment rate INSEE
πt = log( PtPt−1 ) logarithm of CPI INSEE
ct logarithm of real consumption INSEE
per capita 
et logarithm of real exchange rate OECD
yt logarithm of real gross disposable INSEE
income per capita
household consumption per capita and the real disposable income per capita
that are observed on quarterly basis from 1970 I to 1998 III. Their sources are
given in Table 3. We add the following assumptions in our descriptive model:
(i) we limit the dimension of the source of policy shocks to be one as we did
so far, (ii) we consider the exchange rate as an exogenous variable that we do
not try to model, (iii) the monetary authorities try to offset the observed value
of supply shocks, conditionally on that of the exchange rate. This modeling
actually permits to quantify the correlation between interest rate selected by
the authorities and the monetary policy indicators, namely output or unem-
ployment rate and inflation, which are likely to vary with changes in the
policy rule, and some parameters in the consumption equation.
The vector of endogenous variables denoted Yt is composed on the one
hand of variables directly influenced by the monetary policy, namely it ,  ut,
and πt , and on the other hand of the real consumption and the real disposable
income.  
Yt =

it
 ut
πt
 ct
 yt

We consider a simple constrained AR representation. The choice of the lag
order in the Coefficient Generating Process and Conditional Data Generating
process should be based on statistical criteria. In the absence of an appro-
priate theory and criteria, we choose to fix the lag order to 2. We assume that
there exists a cointegration relationship between income and consumption
with a cointegrating vector equal to ( 1 −1 ) as was observed in various
studies (see for instance BLOCH and MAUREL [1992]). This amounts to the
introduction of a variable related to saving per head in the consumption equa-
tion.
Without a structural framework and a priori identification assumptions, we
are unable to distinguish between a change in the target values and a change
in the relative weights of the conflicting objectives; changes in the weights
will induce changes in the first and second order parameters of the model
(this is consistent with ENGLE and HENDRY [1993] approach who suggests
that heteroskedastic models are generally to be considered). We read our
VARX specification as a set of behavioral equations. Two equations will
include random coefficients: the interest rate and the household consumption
equations. The first one describes the rule followed on average by the authori-
ties to set the interest rate according to the past observed values of the
unemployment rate and inflation, the current value of the exchange rate and
the preceding selected values of the interest rate. These last variables capture
their smoothing practice. Stochastic shocks correspond to innovative depar-
ture to the usual rule. We assume that four coefficients are random in this
equation. These are (i) the intercept term, (ii) the lagged interest rate coeffi-
cient, (iii) the lagged unemployment rate coefficient and (iv) the lagged
inflation coefficient. They are supposed to describe the consequences on the
rule of possible changes in authorities’ preferences. The second equation, that
includes random coefficients, describes household consumption choice accor-
ding to the last changes in income, inflation, unemployment rate and interest
rate. Furthermore, it is assumed that this decision is taken conditionally on the
current departure from the usual interest rate setting rule. Two of its coeffi-
cients are considered as random: one is related to the lagged value of the
interest rate and the other one to the cointegration relationship, ie, their past
saving decision. Both are supposed to be the channel through which house-
holds adapt their behaviors to changes in authorities’ preferences.
In short, we work on:
(10)

it =
(
mi + mi,t
) + δi et + (φi i + φi i,t) it−1 + φi i,2it−2
+ (φiu + φiu,t)  ut−1 + (φiπ + φiπ,t) πt−1 + 	3,ivtξt
 ut = mu + δu et + φui it−1 + φuu,1 ut−1
+φuu,2 ut−2 + φuππt−1 + 	3uvtξt + εu,t
πt = mπ + δπ et + φπi it−1 + φπu ut−1
+φππ,1πt−1 + φππ,2πt−2 + 	3,πvtξt + επ,t
 ct = φcc,1 ct−1 + φcc,2 ct−2 + φcy yt−1 +
(
φc + φc,t
)
(ct−1 − yt−1)
+ (φci + φci,t) it−1 + φcu ut−1 + φcππt−1 + 	3,cvtξt + εc,t
 yt = φyc ct−1 + φyy,1 yt−1 + φyy,2 yt−2 + φy (ct−1 − yt−1)
+φyi it−1 + φyu ut−1 + φyππt−1 + 	3,yvtξt + εy,t
We complete these equations with the definition of the deterministic func-
tions µt and vt and the data generating process of the random coefficients. µt
and vt are such that:
(11) µt =
{ 0 if t  T1
µ1 if T1 < t
and,
vt =
{ 1 if t  T1
v1 if T1 < t  T2
v2 if T2 < t
The date T1 corresponds to France joining EMS (March 1979) and T2 to the
deregulation of the French financial market (October 1985). They permit to
take into account these institutional changes. ξt is a scalar white noise N (0,1)
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and corresponds to the structural innovation in the interest rate policy used to
offset inflationary shocks. εt = (εut ,επ t ,εct ,εyt )′ is i.i.d. N (0,H ) with H a
4 × 4 – symmetric full-rank matrix.
Let αt denote the vector of random coefficients in (10). We assume that it
satisfies the following DGP:
(12) αt = Dαt−1 + 	1 (µt + ρηt ) + 	2
(
µt−1 + ρηt−1
)
where D is a 6 × 6 – diagonal matrix, we restrain these parameters to be
positive, 	1 is a 6 × 1 – vector such that ‖	1‖ = 1, ηt is a scalar white noise
N (0,1) . (10) and (12) can be estimated by Kalman filter. See HARVEY [1989]
for a review of this method. We initialize the algorithm by the result of the
estimation of a VAR model based on (10) assuming that the coefficients are
constant and µ1 = 0 and vt = 1, for all t.
Estimation result summary: Regarding the random coefficient generating
process, the estimation results are summarized in the following set of equa-
tions:
mi,t = 0.26
(0.53)
mi,t−1 + 0.85
(11.57)
(ρ ηt + µt ) − 0.47
(−2.22)
(
ρ ηt−1 + µt−1
)
φi i,t = 0.63
(5.43)
φi i,t−1 − 0.39
(−22.50)
(ρ ηt + µt ) + 0.39
(9.20)
(
ρ ηt−1 + µt−1
)
φiu,t = 0.69
(2.87)
φiu,t−1 + 0.00
(0.00)
(ρ ηt + µt ) − 0.37
(−0.55)
(
ρ ηt−1 + µt−1
)
φiπ,t = 0.32
(3.00)
φiπ,t−1 + 0.32
(1.66)
(ρ ηt + µt ) − 0.82
(−7.36)
(
ρ ηt−1 + µt−1
)
φci,t = 0.93
(15.26)
φci,t−1 + 0.09
(2.25)
(ρ ηt + µt ) + 0.03
(0.58)
(
ρ ηt−1 + µt−1
)
φc,t = 0.72
(4.83)
φc,t−1 + 0.07
(0.94)
(ρ ηt + µt ) + 0.14
(1.68)
(
ρ ηt−1 + µt−1
)
where ρ̂2 = 0.36
(3.05)
, µ̂1 = −0.01
(−0.02)
and µt is defined in (11). The values in
parentheses are t-statistics (in bold if significant at a 5% level). In the case of
ρ2, this value (3.05) should be compared with the percentile of a half normal,
it is significant at a 1% level (the critical values are 1.28, 1.64, and 2.32 at
10%, 5% and 1% level). Hence we conclude that random coefficients are
present in the model. But as the t-statistics associated with µ̂1 is – 0.02, the
presence of a deterministic break at date T1 is rejected. All the random coeffi-
cient equations contain estimates that are significantly different from 0 in a
5% level test. 
(
φi i,t
)
t seems well described by a ARMA(1,1) model with a
root close to unity in the MA part. 
(
mi,t
)
t seems to follow an MA model and
the other coefficients have an AR component. When using the test introduced
in Section 2 to test for the presence of random coefficients, we get the follo-
wing likelihood ratio tests:
• testing for H0: ρ2 = 0
−2
(
lnlT
(
θ̂0
) − sup
v∈N
lnlT
(
θ̂v,v
)) = −2(−388.09 − (−325.33)) = 125.52
• testing for H0: ρ2 = 0 and µ1 = 0
−2
(
lnlT
(
θ̂0
) − sup
v∈N
lnlT
(
θ̂v,v
)) = −2(−408.91 − (−325.33)) = 167.16
In both cases, we reject the null. We therefore reject the absence of random
coefficients in the model, but clearly the deterministic break is not to be
considered. We now turn to the invariance properties of φci,t and φc,t to
changes in mi,t , φi i,t , φiu,t and φiπ,t . Here, it corresponds with obvious nota-
tions to the test for 	φc,1 = 0 , 	φc,2 = 0 , 	φci ,1 = 0 and 	φci ,2 = 0.
Technically speaking, the two associated autoregressive coefficients are not
identified under the null. We are in a similar situation to that of testing for the
presence of random coefficients in the model. The usual asymptotic results
may not be valid and in the test decision, the use of a χ2 percentile may be
wrong. Simulations of the asymptotic law for a given couple of values of the
autoregressive parameters and maximization over a grid of values for these
nuisance parameters may be necessary. We get the following likelihood ratio
test:
• when testing for H0: 	φc,1 = 	φc,2 = 	φci ,1 = 	φci ,2 = 0
−2 (lnlT (θ̂0) − lnlT (θ̂)) = −2(−355.82 − (−325.33)) = 60.98
This test statistic is very large in comparison with standard χ2(4) percen-
tile. It seems reasonable to think that we reject the invariance property. At
least, one of the parameters is clearly significantly different from 0 (	φci ,1.)
In other words, in the past, the hypothesis that a co-movement of the coeffi-
cients in the household consumption equation and in the interest rate setting
rule cannot be rejected. We interpret this property in the following sense:
changes in the authorities’ preferences that implied changes in their interest
rate setting rule may have induced changes in the household consumption
decision process.
The change in the variance of the interest rate shocks (ξt )t is given by
ν̂1 = 0.84 (t statistics equal to 4.61) and ν̂2 = 0.33 (t statistics equal to 5.07).
It decreases during the period, which is consistent with what can be observed
on the inflation series. Various reasons can be given to explain this result, two
of them seems to be worth mentioning. First, it may correspond to the fact
that Banque de France implemented during this time period more and more
elaborate strategies playing with various interest rates and terms. This allows
it to be more efficient. Second, during the same period, Banque de France’s
objectives became more and more publicly known and its actions foreseeable.
Model contributions to the data analysis: We propose to illustrate three
aspects of the data analysis obtained through the estimated model. We
examine sequentially the relationships between the various random coeffi-
cients, the forecast performance of the Random Coefficient VARX model
relative to those of a standard VARX model and the existence of a large
change in the coefficients during the first part of the nineties.
First, as emphasized earlier, we can plot the relationships between some of
the random coefficients. In Figure 1, we show the relationships between mi,t ,
φi i,t , φci,t , φiu,t , and φc,t .
92
POLICY EVALUATION IN MACROECONOMETRIC DOUBLY STOCHASTIC MODELS 93
FIGURE 1
Plot of Some Random Coefficients
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φi i,t is related to the speed of adjustment of the interest rate as an imple-
menting tool of the monetary policy. When it increases, it means that the past
values of the interest rate play a more important role in the setting rule, the
interest rate adjusts more smoothly to its desired value. mi,t affects this
desired value of the interest rate. As mi,t and φi i,t are negatively correlated, a
choice of a more persistent setting rule implies a lesser desired value. Over a
given time period, the global average effect results from both parameters that
more or less cancel each other out.(
φiu + φiu,t
)
measures the sensitivity of the interest rate setting rule to the
changes in the unemployment rate,
(
φci + φci,t
)
the sensitivity of change in
consumption decision to the past interest rate and 
(
φc + φc,t
)
to the past
saving decision.6 The random coefficients are all centered around zero so that
the average effects of 
(
φiu + φiu,t
)
,
(
φci + φci,t
)
and 
(
φc + φc,t
)
are given
by the constants: φiu, φci, and φc. The estimates of φiu, φci, and φc are
respectively 0.02 (t-statistic 0.02), 0.13 (t-statistic 0.43) and −3.24 (t-statistic
-12.73). When φiu,t is negative (or equivalently φiu + φiu,t < 0 since
φiu  0), the interest rate is ceteris paribus set at a lower value when unem-
ployment increases. As φiu,t and φc,t are negatively correlated (Figure 1), φc,t
will be positive and φc,t + φc will be smaller in absolute value (remember
that φc,t + φc < 0 and (ct − yt ) < 0). The first conclusion we draw is that
φiu,t negative should result in a lower consumption increase. This conclusion
is negated by an opposite effect due to the fact that φiu,t and φci,t are negati-
vely correlated. When φiu,t is negative, φci,t is positive. This implies, from
Model (10), a larger increase in current consumption for a given interest rate.
Reconciling these features may be done in the following way. Ceteris paribus,
active monetary policy that takes into account changes in unemployment is
implemented by gradually reducing the interest rate. It is supposed to reduce
the probability of being unemployed. Households will increase their
consumption for two reasons: (a) they are less likely to become unemployed
and (b) borrowing is cheaper.
Second, to illustrate the performance of the model introduced in this
section, we proceed to the estimation of an unconstrained VARX (p,l) model
without random coefficients, of the type:
Yt =C + A1Yt−1 + A2Yt−2 + ... + ApYt−p + b0 et
+ b1 et−1 + ... + bl et−l + εt
where et is the growth rate of the exchange rate (considered exogenous) and
Yt = (it , ut ,πt , ct ,yt )′. First we discuss the choice of l and p. By doing
successive LR test, we find evidence in favor of l = 0. To determine the
number of lags, p, in the VARX model, we perform several tests. The AIC
criterion gives p = 2 and BIC criterion gives p = 1. We test H0: Ap = 0
using a LR test statistic, this test suggests p = 2. Finally, we perform a
6. Savings evolve negatively with the variables introduced in the equation (ct − yt ).
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FIGURE 2
In-the-sample Forecast of Real Interest Rates
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FIGURE 3
In-the-sample Forecast of Inflation
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FIGURE 4
In-the-sample Forecast of Change in Household Consumption
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FIGURE 5
RCVAR and VAR Forecast Conditional Standard Errors
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FIGURE 6
φci,t and Saving between 1988 and 1994
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Portmanteau test, Q, to test whether the first h residual autocorrelations are
zero, for up to 24 lags (see LÜTKEPOHL [1993], Formula (4.4.23)). This test
casts some doubt on the adequacy of the model for p = 2 as the null is
accepted at a 1% level up to 20 lags, (it accepts the null hypothesis of the resi-
dual whiteness for p = 4 at any reasonable level). The conclusions of these
different tests are mixed. As we prefer a parsimonious model, we select
p = 2. On the whole, the number of parameters in the VARX model is equal
to that of the RCVAR model. This allows for a direct comparison of their rela-
tive performances. We plot in-the-sample forecasts for three variables :
interest rate, household consumption and inflation. For both models, we only
used past available information.7 These plots are reported in Figures 2, 3 and
4. They show that heteroskedasticity effects captured by the random coeffi-
cient model for the various equations describe appropriately the fluctuations
in its variance and allow for the computation of relevant confidence interval
that are not provided by the VAR model. Forecasts appear more accurate into
RCVAR than in the VAR.
We plot, in Figure 5, the conditional standard errors for four variables under
study. A computation of the mean conditional standard errors show that the
Random Coefficient VARX model dominates in terms of forecast accuracy
the standard VARX (for a similar number of degrees of freedom). Indeed, we
get that average conditional standard errors are respectively 2%, 2% and 3%
smaller in the case of the RCVARX than in the case of the VARX for the
interest rate, inflation and household consumption. Moreover, for unemploy-
ment, using RCVAR represents a substantial benefit (10%). Note that only
interest rate and consumption have random coefficients in their equations, this
explains why standard errors are much more variable for these two series.
Finally, we address the question of a possible break in the household
consumption equation in the late eighties. Figure 6 presents the value of the
interest rate coefficient φci,t in the household consumption equation between
1988 and 1994. From 1988 on, φci,t decreases dramatically. From Model
(10), we know that this implies a decline in the growth rate of consumption
for a given value of the interest rate. This is consistent with the data. Despite
the fact that the growth rate of income was not yet decreasing, savings – that
is −(ct − yt ) – increase during the late eighties and the beginning of the nine-
ties (see Figure 6). It certainly results from a complex mechanism. One
reason, but not the only one, is that households may have anticipated the
changes in the monetary authorities’ preferences that would result from the
independence of the Central Bank as controlling inflation was to become its
main goal. Note that from Figure 1, φci,t negative corresponds to φiu,t posi-
tive in the interest rate setting rule. Hence, in the nineties, increasing
unemployment is no longer associated with smaller interest rate as it would be
if fighting unemployment were the priority.
7. From the Kalman filter, we use only filtered quantities and no smoothed ones.
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5 Conclusion
In this article, we propose to use random coefficient autoregressive models
to test for the immunity of a descriptive behavioral equation to the Lucas
Critique. We assume that coefficients in the equations of variables under the
(partial) control of the authorities and those in the equation of the variables
chosen by the private agents may co-move. We introduce test procedures to
analyze the presence and features of this co-movement and hence to assess
the empirical relevance of the critique. We applied these tests to study the
immunity of the French household consumption equation to changes in the
monetary policy. Invariance is rejected and Lucas Critique appears to be rele-
vant. Our approach has several advantages. It permits to quantify the
consequences of a change in the monetary policy equation on the coefficients
of the behavioral equation. It thus gives a framework to do simulations of
policy scenarios as well as forecasting as long as policy shocks are homoge-
neous over time. Our approach is essentially descriptive. It is therefore
important to be able to identify and interpret the past changes in policy in
order to produce informative simulations.
From a statistical point of view, testing the constancy of parameters in a
Random Coefficient model is not straightforward because some of the stan-
dard assumptions are not satisfied. We use recent results by ANDREWS [1999,
2001] to show that the LR statistic is asymptotically nuisance parameter free
and to provide its critical values. A small Monte Carlo study shows that this
statistic tends to over-reject in small samples and therefore that empirical
critical values are preferable to asymptotic ones. 
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1. We follow closely the approach proposed by
ANDREWS [1999, 2001]. We first study the properties of the score and infor-
mation matrix and then check a set of assumptions necessary to derive an
asymptotic result. In our derivation of the time properties for the score func-
tion, we consider its strictly stationary counterpart. This partly results from
the initial values we take for the expectation and variance of the random coef-
ficients. They are equal to the unconditional mean and variance of the random
process under study:
Eαt = 0
vecV αt = ρ2
[(
Iq2 − Tv ⊗ Tv
)−1
vec	v	
′
v
]
= ρ2vecHv
Under H0, the score for the observation at date t is given by:
∂lnlt (θ,v)
∂θ ′
∣∣∣∣
ρ2=0
=

(
Yt−1 ⊗ In
)
−1εt
−1
2
G ′nvec
(
−1 − −1εtε′t−1
)
−1
2
T r
(
K Zt Hv Z ′t K ′−1
(
In − εtε′t−1
)) + ε′t−1K Zt TvUv,t−1

′
where Uv,t is a process that satisfies the following autoregressive equation:
Uv,t = TvUv,t−1 + Hv Z ′t K ′−1εt = TvUv,t−1 + Hvζt
and Gn is the duplication matrix (see HARVILLE [1997], page 352). We notice
that in fact only the last component of the score is affected by the nuisance
parameters, the first components are the ones we get in the model under the
null. Similar computations lead to the following information matrix:
−E ∂
2lnl (θ,v)
∂θ∂θ ′
=
( I00 I0ρ2 (v)
Iρ20 (v) Iρ2 (v)
)
= I (v)
where I00 is the information matrix of the model under the null that is block
diagonal,
Iρ2 (v) =
1
2
ET r
(
K Zt Hv Z ′t K ′−1K Zt Hv Z ′t K ′−1
)
+ E
(
Uv,t−1Tv Z ′t K ′−1K Zt TvUv,t−1
)
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and,
Iρ20 (v) =(
EUv,t−1Tv Z ′t K ′−1
(
Y ′t−1 ⊗ In
)
Evec
(
−1K Zt Hv Z ′t K ′−1
)′ Gn )
We now list a set of properties of the problem under study necessary to use
Theorem 2 and 3 in ANDREWS [2001].
Constraints on the values of the parameters (,v) imply absence of tren-
ding variables in the model under the null, so that Assumption 5 (ANDREWS
[2001]) is satisfied. Under H0, the problem we consider is a standard one and
the likelihood function l0(θ) is strictly concave. Let θ0 be the value of θ at
this maximum, Assumption 40, 9 and 10 in ANDREWS [2001] are satisfied. On
the other hand the likelihood l (θ,v) is continuously differentiable with
respect to all its arguments and l
(
θ,0,v
) = l0 (θ) .
The most important property to establish is the functional convergence of
the joint process of the score and information matrix as a process indexed by
v ∈ N . We add the assumption on N that on this set, the eigenvalues of the
information matrix I (v) are positive, strictly larger than 0 and bounded.
Assumption 3* in ANDREWS [2001] then allows us to limit the study to the
score function. Indeed, the information matrix is non random, does not
depend on T and is symmetric. The two first components of the score are
those of standard maximum likelihood model under gaussian assumption
which are independent of v. The result holds. Only the last component of the
score depends on v and we need to first prove a stochastic equicontinuity to
get the required convergence. In our framework with strong distributional
assumptions we have the following result:
LEMMA: 1√
T
∑T
t=1
∂ lnlt (θ,v)
∂ρ2
∣∣∣
ρ2=0
is stochastically equicontinuous in
v ∈ N , where N is a compact set.
PROOF: To obtain this result, we prove a Lipschitz property of the score in v.
We compute:
1√
T
T∑
t=1
∂lnlt (θ,v1)
∂ρ2
∣∣∣∣
ρ2=0
− 1√
T
T∑
t=1
∂lnlt (θ,v2)
∂ρ2
∣∣∣∣
ρ2=0
and decompose this expression into two quantities:
(I ) = − 1
2
√
T
T∑
t=1
T r
(
K Zt
(
Hv1 − Hv2
)
Z ′t K−1
(
In − εtε′t−1
))
and 
(I I ) = 1√
T
T∑
t=1
ε′t−1K Zt
(
Tv1Uv1,t−1 − Tv2Uv2,t−1
)
(I ) can be rewritten under the form:
(I ) = 1
2
T r
((
Hv1 − Hv2
) 1√
T
T∑
t=1
(
ζtζ
′
t − Et
(
ζtζ
′
t
)) )
with ζt = Z ′t K ′−1εt that is a gaussian heteroskedastic independent process.
Let ζ2,t denote ζtζ ′t − Et
(
ζtζ
′
t
)
, then ζ2t is a martingale difference sequence,
heteroskedastic but such that E max
i
∣∣∣ζ 42,i,t ∣∣∣ < +∞ (under our distributional
assumptions and the absence of trending variables). A central limit theorem
applies. We get using Cauchy-Schwartz inequality:
(I ) 
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ 1√T
T∑
t=1
(
ζtζ
′
t − Et
(
ζtζ
′
t
))∥∥∥∥∥
2
∥∥Hv1 − Hv2∥∥2
where, ∥∥Hv1 − Hv2∥∥22 = vec (Hv1 − Hv2)′ vec (Hv1 − Hv2)
but this last expression as by construction vecHv1 =
[(
Iq2 − Tv1 ⊗ Tv1
)−1
vec	v1	
′
v1
]
, is a continuous differentiable function in v1 whose partial deri-
vatives are continuous and therefore absolutely bounded on the compact set
N, so that ∃ξ1 > 0 such that:∥∥Hv1 − Hv2∥∥2  ξ1 sup
i
∣∣v1,i − v2,i ∣∣
and thus,
(I )  Op (1) sup
i
∣∣v1,i − v2,i ∣∣
We turn now to (I I ) we rewrite as follows:
(I I ) =
T∑
h=1
T r
(
̂ζ,T (h)
√
T
(
T hv1 Hv1 − T hv2 Hv2
))
where ̂ζ,T (h) =
1
T
∑T
t=h ζt−hζ
′
t . The arguments we propose to use are
similar to those used in the previous step. We consider the expressions:∥∥∥T hv1 Hv1 − T hv2 Hv2∥∥∥2  ∥∥∥(T hv1 − T hv2) Hv1∥∥∥2 + ∥∥∥T hv2 (Hv1 − Hv2)∥∥∥2
we have: ∥∥∥T hv2 (Hv1 − Hv2)∥∥∥2  ∥∥∥T hv2∥∥∥1 ∥∥Hv1 − Hv2∥∥2
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where, ∥∥∥T hv2∥∥∥1 = max {√λ such that λ is an eigenvalue of T h′v2 T hv2}
so that by assumption:∥∥∥T hv2 (Hv1 − Hv2)∥∥∥2  ξ1(1 + δ)h supi ∣∣v1,i − v2,i ∣∣
On the other hand,
T hv1 − T hv2 =
h−1∑
j=1
T jv2
(
Tv1 − Tv2
)
T h− j−1v1
so that:∥∥∥(T hv1 − T hv2) Hv1∥∥∥2 
h−1∑
j=1
∥∥∥T jv2 (Tv1 − Tv2) T h− j−1v1 Hv1∥∥∥2

h−1∑
j=1
∥∥∥T jv2 (Tv1 − Tv2)∥∥∥2 ∥∥∥T h− j−1v1 Hv1∥∥∥2

h−1∑
j=1
∥∥∥T jv2∥∥∥1 ∥∥Tv1 − Tv2∥∥2 ∥∥∥T h− j−1v1 ∥∥∥1 ∥∥Hv1∥∥2

(h−1)
∥∥Hv1∥∥2
(1+δ)h−1
∥∥Tv1 − Tv2∥∥2
By continuity of the partial derivatives of the function 
∥∥Tv1 − Tv2∥∥2 with
respect to υ and the continuity of 
∥∥Hv1∥∥2 on the compact set N , we conclude
that ∃ξ2 > 0 such that:∥∥∥(T hv1 − T hv2) Hv1∥∥∥2  (h − 1) ξ2(1 + δ)h−1 supi ∣∣v1,i − v2,i ∣∣
and ∃ (ξ3,ξ4) such that:∥∥∥T hv1 Hv1 − T hv2 Hv2∥∥∥2  (ξ3h + ξ4)(1 + δ)h−1 supi ∣∣v1,i − v2,i ∣∣
We now need to establish that:
T∑
h=1
∥∥∥̂ζ,T (h) √T ∥∥∥2 (ξ3h + ξ4)(1 + δ)h−1 = Op (1)
but ζt is a gaussian heteroskedastic independent process. We split the set of
indices {1,...T } into two subsets {1,... [cT a]} and {[cT a] + 1,...T } with
a < 1. Under our assumptions, we know that a joint convergence of the esti-
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mates ̂ζ,T (h) for h in the first subset holds, this allows us to state that the
first partial sum is 
∑[cT a]
h=1
∥∥∥̂ζ,T (h) √T ∥∥∥2 (ξ3h+ξ4)(1+δ)h−1 = Op (1) . On the
second subset, we use the fact that ζt are Op (1), their product is Op (1), we
consider sum of Op (1) random variables weighted by absolutely summable
constants due to the fact that 11+δ < 1, whence the result.
Under the regularity conditions listed above, Theorem 4(c) in ANDREWS
[2001] says that:
sup
v∈N
(
lnl
(
θ̂v,v
) − lnl (θˆ0,0,v))⇒ 12 supv∈N
((
max
{
Zρ2,v,0
})2 (
e′I−1v e
)−1)
where Zρ2,v is the asymptotic distribution of the last component of the score
and e is a vector whose all components are equal to 0 except for the last one
which is equal to 1. Because the distribution in parentheses does not depend
on v under the null, we have the standard result that:
2
{
lnl
(
θ̂
) − lnl (θˆ0,0,v)} ⇒ 12χ2 (0) + 12χ2 (1)
so that the likelihood ratio test follows the asymptotic distribution stated in
Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. We now turn to the situation in which dummy
variables are present in the Coefficient generating process (Model (B)). For
sake of simplicity, we limit our attention to the case of a unique dummy
variable: µt = µ1t>[τ0T ] but as said above the additional parameter τ0 is
given a priori and therefore is not included into the nuisance parameter set.
Under H0, the score for the observation at date t is given by:
∂lnlt (θ,v)
∂θ ′
∣∣∣∣
ρ2=0,µ=0
=

(
Yt−1 ⊗ In
)
−1εt
−1
2
G ′nvec
(
−1 − −1εtε′t−1
)
	′vT
t−[τ0T ]
v Z ′t K ′−1εt 1t>[τ0T ]
−12 T r
(
K Zt Hv Z ′t K ′−1
(
In − εtε′t−1
)) + ε′t−1K Zt TvUv,t−1

′
and the information matrix by:
−E ∂
2lnl(θ,v)
∂θ∂θ ′
=
( I00 I0 (v)′
I0 (v) I (v)
)
= I (v)
where I00 is the information matrix of the model under the null that is block
diagonal,
I0 (v) =(
E
∑
t>[τ0T ] 	
′
vT t−[τ0T ]v Z ′t K ′−1
(
Y ′t−1 ⊗ In
)
0
EU ′v,t−1Tv Z ′t K ′−1
(
Y ′t−1 ⊗ In
)
Evec
(
−1 K Zt Hv Z ′t K ′−1
)′ Gn
)
and,
I (v) =
(
Iµ (v) Iµ,ρ2 (v)
Iρ2,µ (v) Iρ2(v)
)
where:
Iµ (v) = E
∑
t>[τ0T ]
	′vT t−[τ0T ]v Z ′t K ′−1K Zt T t−[τ0T ]v 	v
and,
Iµ,ρ2 (v) = E
∑
t>[τ0T ]
	′vT t−[τ0T ]v Z ′t K ′−1K Zt TvUv,t−1,
We again have to establish the stochastic equicontinuity of the score func-
tion. Only the component related to µ must be studied. We simply have to
notice that it is equal to 1√
T
∑T
t=1 	′vT
t−[τ0T ]
v 1t>[τ0T ]ζt with the above nota-
tions so that the difference between the score for the nuisance parameter v1
and v2 is equal to:
1√
T
T∑
t=1
(
	′v1 T
t−[τ0T ]
v1 1t>[τ0T ] − 	′v2 T t−[τ0T ]v2 1t>[τ0T ]
)
ζt
and the stochastic equicontinuity follows with similar arguments to those used
in the preceding proof once we set v ∈ N a compact set.
Let δ = (θ,µ) be the set of all parameters except for ρ2. Let Gδv be the
limit in distribution (under H0) of the score with respect to (wrt) δ in Model
B. Let Gδ be the limit in distribution (under H0) of the score wrt δ in the
restricted model where ρ2 = µ = 0. Similarly, let Iδv and Iδ be the block of
the information matrix corresponding to δ. From Theorems 2 and 3 of
ANDREWS [2001], the LR statistic converges to:
2 sup
v∈N
(
lnl
(
θ̂v,v
) − lnl (θˆ0,0,v))
⇒ sup
v∈N
((
max
{
Zρ2,v,0
})2 (
e′I−1v e
)−1)
+ sup
v∈N
GδvI−1δv Gδv − GδI−1δ Gδ
= 1
2
χ2 (0) + 1
2
χ2 (1) + χ2 (dim µ)
To prove that GδvI−1δv Gδv converges to a chi-square and is therefore
nuisance parameter free, one needs to use the CLT of martingale difference
sequences. The result of Proposition 2 follows.
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